Born Again Christian; Biblical Fundamentalist, Received Text-KJV, Dispensational

Born Again Christian; Biblical Fundamentalist, Received Text-KJV, Dispensational

Saturday, December 15, 2018

Objectivism and Evolution: No Contradictions by Edward Hudgins





The following article is by Edward Hudgins as posted on"Sense of Life Objectivists."


September 21, 2010 -- The essay “Why Ayn Rand’s Philosophy is Incomplete” by the Prometheus staff claims that the facts of biological evolution reveal a logical flaw in Objectivist philosophy. This claim is based on serious philosophical confusion and a misunderstanding of the philosophy developed by Rand.
The essay states that “One of Objectivism's fundamental axioms is that ‘existence is identity,’ which Rand derived from Aristotle's law of identity,” that is to say, A is A. The essay also states that “evolution shows us that existence is a process of evolving identity.” It then concludes that “Far from the ‘A is A’ certainty of Aristotlelian-Randian thought, evolution holds that change is the only true constant. Time's arrow specializes in contradiction.”
What changes and what doesn’t
To untangle this confusion, we must ask what it means to say that everything that exists has an identity. A is A, that is to say, the law of identity, is a metaphysical premise or axiom. It is the acknowledgment that to exist is to be something in particular, to have certain attributes and not to have others. Change in the world does not contradict the fact that to exist is to possess a certain identity. Rather, how an entity changes is an aspect or attribute of its identity. Change occurs in an orderly, law-like manner. Rand states that “The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act.” Here “action” means any kind of change.
Observe that concrete entities are what changes. A flower grows. A rock rolls down a hill. A planet orbits the sun. Hydrogen atoms, subject to intense gravitational forces inside the sun, fuse together, becoming helium atoms and releasing a certain amount of energy.
Observe also that there is something constant in these and in all cases of change. Specifically, entities change in a law-like rather than a random manner. Such change is an aspect of an entity’s identity. According to the Prometheus essay, “evolution holds that change is the only true constant.” Really? What about the laws of evolution? Would the essay’s authors maintain that in the period of a few seconds a flower might transform into a dinosaur and then a starfish, and then a volcano? Why not, if all is change?
Of course, evolution refers to the fact that some individual living organisms suffer genetic mutation; that the attributes that are altered by mutations can confer survival advantages or disadvantages on the organism depending on the environment; that when a mutation confers an advantage, the organism will be more likely to survive and produce offspring which, in turn, will pass along those advantageous genes to the next generation. Over many generations more mutations occur, changing the individual organisms in subsequent generations. Over long periods of time, individuals might be greatly changed from earlier organisms from which they came. We say that the species has evolved. It is that law-like manner of change that we refer to as evolution.
Indeed, the task of science is to discover such laws or constants concerning the nature of entities. A plant needs water, carbon dioxide, and nutrients to survive and flourish. The force of an object is equal to its mass times its acceleration. And so on.
Forms vs. concepts
The Prometheus essay seems to treat “identity” as if it were a metaphysical essence or entity, as if it were some sort of eternal and unchanging Form. It then attributes such a view to Objectivism and criticizes that view for not allowing for change and evolution. But Objectivism explicitly rejects this view of identity.
Objectivism understands that the concepts by which we identify entities and their attributes are not metaphysical entities but, rather, the epistemological means by which we understand the world, by which we classify things, by which we have rational knowledge. Rand had a very specific understanding of concepts. Rand states that a concept “is a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated according to a specific characteristic(s ) and united by a specific definition.” In other words, to define “human” as a “rational animal” is to observe attributes that all humans share with certain other entities—animals—as well as attributes that distinguish humans from those entities—the capacity for rational knowledge. Were there creatures a million years ago that could be identified by the concept “human?” The evidence says “No.” We would have to use a concept other than “human” to describe those earlier creatures. Were there creatures back then from which today’s humans evolved? The answer is “Yes.”
Whatever the attributes of those creatures from which modern humans evolved, the creatures today to which we apply the concept “human” have a certain identity, that is, certain attributes that we can describe and understand. Among those attributes is that fact that they did evolve from earlier creatures through a process that we describe as evolution.
How blank a slate?
The essay quotes Rand’s statement that “I am not a student of the theory of evolution and, therefore, I am neither its supporter nor its opponent.” Let’s acknowledge that evolution is a fact. The Prometheus essay asserts that Rand’s agnosticism led her to misunderstand human nature. She said that “Man’s emotional mechanism is like an electronic computer, which his mind has to program—and the programming consists of the values his mind chooses.”
According to the essay, evolutionary psychology tells us that “Human psychology is far from a tabula rasa, and is hard-wired with various biases, heuristic tendencies, and social instincts which mitigate against all attempts to employ pure rationality.” The essay acknowledges most human achievements come “thanks to our ability to transcend these evolutionary handicaps,” adding “but gainsaying their existence is sheer misrepresentation of scientific reality.”
Here the essay has a point. Recent discoveries about evolution and the brain do, in fact, reveal that human nature is much more complex than perhaps Rand understood. Even so, a close look at Rand’s works shows her to be a more sophisticated observer of human nature than perhaps the essayists appreciate. But that’s another discussion. Still it is crucial for Objectivist thinkers to take account of these discoveries if they wish to refine their understanding of how individuals might live happy lives.
But these discoveries so far do not undermine the basic Objectivist understanding of ethics. The essayists acknowledge the human ability “to transcend these evolutionary handicaps.” Another way to put this is that we humans can use our volition to check our immediate emotions, including those that might involve hard-wired capacities. We can reflect upon the world around us and on ourselves and our own nature. We can ask how we might act, including how we might discipline our emotions or hard-wired tendencies in order to best survive and flourish. This is the virtue of rationality.
Here we also see that in a very crucial way humans are “tabula rasa.” We do not have pre-programmed conceptual knowledge. Even if we are “hard-wired with various biases, heuristic tendencies, and social instincts,” it is only through a volitional, rational process that we discover and validate knowledge about the physical world in which we exist and about our own nature—our nature as evolved beings and as beings that can only survive and flourish if we act in accordance with certain principles found in our own nature, that is, in our identity as human beings. In any case, any instincts or biases that we humans have do not give us automatic knowledge concerning how to survive and flourish. We must discover this knowledge, using our rational capacity. From this perspective we might as well consider ourselves to be “tabula rasa.”
The Prometheus essay acknowledges Rand’s insights about free choice, free markets, and limited government in society. But these insights trace back to the deeper Objectivist understanding of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. The essayists rightly ask about the implications of evolution for Objectivism, but they would do well to ask about their own understanding of Objectivism so that they might avoid the errors analyzed above and have a better understanding of the foundations of the freedoms that they rightly cherish.