A Heavenly Pilgrim's Sanctification
Friday, August 21, 2026
The Seen and the Unseen Cost of Mamdani’s Grocery Discount 08/18/2026•Mises Wire•Tom Wilson
https://mises.org/mises-wire/seen-and-unseen-cost-mamdanis-grocery-discount
Henry Hazlitt built his entire case for sound economics on one lesson: judge a policy not by its immediate, visible effect on one group, but by its full effect over time on everyone it touches. Bad economics, he argued, sees only the seen. Good economics traces the unseen as well.
New York Mayor Mamdani’s proposed 30 percent discount on groceries is a textbook case of the seen. It is immediate, easy to picture, and politically appealing—shoppers checking out and paying less. But Hazlitt’s lesson demands a harder question: where did the other 30 percent go? Costs do not vanish because the government owns the store. They simply become less visible, paid by someone, somewhere, who isn’t standing at the register.
The lower price at the register is the visible part of the policy—what every shopper sees, every time, at checkout. But Hazlitt’s method requires looking past the immediate effect to the less obvious one. If a grocery store sells food below its true cost, someone else must make up the difference. The question is never whether consumers receive a discount. It’s whether that discount represents real savings or simply moves part of the bill somewhere else.
In a private market, a discount usually reflects lower costs, greater efficiency, or a business voluntarily sacrificing some profit to win customers. Whoever offers the discount also bears its cost. A government-run grocery store breaks that link. If it consistently sells below the cost of providing groceries, the shortfall doesn’t disappear—it gets financed through public funds. Part of the grocery bill simply moves from the checkout counter to the tax bill.
The unseen cost doesn’t stop at the subsidy itself. Every dollar spent keeping prices artificially low is a dollar that can’t be spent on anything else. Those same funds could have stayed with taxpayers to spend or invest as they saw fit, or been directed to other public services entirely. Government cannot manufacture new purchasing power by changing who writes the check. It can only redirect resources from one use to another—and every redirection has a cost that goes unseen by the person enjoying the discount.
The subsidy doesn’t just move money around—it changes the competitive landscape those dollars flow into. Independent grocers and family-owned markets cover their costs through sales alone. They pay rent, utilities, payroll, and inventory out of what customers actually spend with them, with no public backstop if the math doesn’t work. A government-run store selling similar groceries at subsidized prices puts those businesses at a disadvantage—not because they’re less efficient, but because they’re competing against a rival whose losses are covered by taxpayers rather than corrected by the market.
This is precisely the kind of effect Hazlitt warned readers to look for: the one that doesn’t show up in the first day’s headlines. Competition is what forces every grocery store to keep prices low, shelves stocked, and service sharp—because shoppers always have somewhere else to go if a store falls short. Subsidize one competitor, and that discipline weakens for everyone else. Some independent grocers may respond by cutting already thin margins further. Others may not be able to compete at all.
Hazlitt’s most famous illustration was the broken window: a vandal smashes a shopkeeper’s window, and onlookers console themselves that at least the glazier gets new business. What they don’t see is what the shopkeeper would have bought instead—a suit, tools, inventory—and the jobs that spending would have supported. The visible job created by the break obscures the invisible ones destroyed by it.
The same logic applies here. A new government-run grocery store creates visible jobs—cashiers, stockers, managers, a ribbon-cutting with local officials on hand to take credit. Those jobs are easy to point to and easy to photograph. What’s harder to see is the independent grocer down the street who loses enough customers to cut a shift, delay a hire, or close entirely. Those jobs don’t disappear with a headline. They simply never appear, or they quietly end, and no one holds a ceremony for them.
This is not an argument that government stores create zero jobs. It’s an argument that counting only the jobs it visibly creates, while ignoring the ones it invisibly displaces, is exactly the kind of one-sided accounting Hazlitt spent his career warning against. The full ledger includes both sides—the seen hire and the unseen layoff—and only one of them tends to make the news.
None of this diminishes the real strain rising food prices put on family budgets. Groceries have become one of the fastest-growing line items in household spending, and the frustration behind that is legitimate. The question was never whether food should be more affordable, it’s how. Markets lower prices by raising productivity, sharpening competition, and cutting the real cost of production. Subsidies do none of that; they don’t shrink the cost of producing food—they only decide who pays it, and how visibly.
A 30 percent discount makes for an easy headline, because the benefit is immediate and the beneficiary is standing right there at the register. The costs are quieter. They show up in higher taxes, in a grocer down the street who lays off a cashier, in the public services that don’t get funded because the money went to keeping shelves subsidized instead. Hazlitt’s one lesson was never that government spending has no effects—it’s that good economics means tracing all of them, not just the ones that make it into the ribbon-cutting photo.
Equality Before the Law, Not Privilege by Group Membership 08/18/2026•Mises Wire•Wanjiru Njoya
https://mises.org/mises-wire/equality-law-not-privilege-group-membership
Ludwig von Mises defended the principle of equality before the law as it was understood within the classical liberal tradition of “the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century.”
Eighteenth century liberalism rejected the notion of “a select class of privileged persons” who had special rights and freedoms. The fundamental purpose of equality under the law was to ensure that no group is granted rights solely by virtue of membership, rights that remain unavailable to those outside it.
But what now passes for classical liberalism does not reflect the same principle. Much of what people now call classical liberalism comes from the progressive egalitarianism of the 1960s. A key principle in modern “classical liberalism” is the notion of “equal opportunities” that did not exist in the eighteenth century.
Modern notions of equal opportunities, even though misleadingly described as “classical liberal,” are increasingly institutionalized as group rights and protections. The premise of equal opportunities is grounded in group identity, in the sense that the only way to determine whether opportunities are equal is by comparing the experience of one’s own group with that of others.
This premise—that group identity is the relevant unit of analysis for defining rights—prevailed before the classical tradition arose. Rights were historically based on one’s position in what Mises described as the “social pyramid,” for example whether one was of “noble birth,” a “lord” or a “serf” of lowly birth. Mises explained that, “In the precapitalistic society those had been paramount who had the strength to beat their weaker fellows into submission.” Only the strongest prevailed. The classical ideal of equality under the law was formulated precisely to reject that.
Now there were only citizens with equal rights. No one was handicapped or persecuted on account of his nationality, his opinions, or his faith.
Yet the distinction between lord and serf has now been replaced by group identity distinctions. Persecution based on political opinion and party affiliation has become prevalent. Double standards often apply in the protection of free speech.
In Minnesota a young mother was convicted of using a racial slur against a black family, despite the theoretical application of the First Amendment to all citizens.
In the United Kingdom, a conservative mother was jailed for two years for expressing her outrage on social media, following the murder of three children, using the words “set fire to all the hotels [housing immigrants] for all I care. If that makes me racist so be it.” But a left-wing politician who called for protestors to be slaughtered in the streets using similar language was said to be exercising his fundamental right to free speech.
Free speech too often depends on which group one has offended. Once free speech is vested in some but not others, inequality before the law is the result.
It is ironic that, in a time when the concept of equality before the law has become well established in theory, what prevails in practice is the return of group privilege. The only difference is that group privilege now depends on personal or political identity rather than social hierarchy and fortunes of birth.
This uneven application of the law is not a classical liberal principle. The classical principle is that everyone has the right to free speech. Mises emphasized the importance of the law promoting the general welfare, rather than conferring special privileges on favored groups:
Liberalism has always had in view the good of the whole, not that of any special group. . . . Historically, liberalism was the first political movement that aimed at promoting the welfare of all, not that of special groups.
. . .
Liberalism is not a policy in the interest of any particular group, but a policy in the interest of all mankind.
That is the foundation of Mises’s preference for peace over war. War is ruinous to all, including the victor. Peace sustained by equality before the law benefits both the weak and the strong—“peace is for him, the stronger, just as advantageous as it is for the weaker.” Allocation of rights and privileges by group membership leads only to hostility and conflict.
Whoever denies rights to a part of the population must always be prepared for a united attack by the disenfranchised on the privileged.
What seems to have happened is that “social justice” activists campaigned against unfairness to black people and then commenced demanding unfairness to white people. While social justice activists are no longer silenced, they have adopted the mantle of silencing others.
Further, as Mises explains, the privilege that follows from merit is not to be viewed in the same light as privilege conferred by state edicts because, in his view, the privilege that follows from ability and training is “beneficial to the general public.” He gives the example of “privilege” conferred upon lawyers to become judges, while those without legal training lack the same opportunity. The lawyer enjoys a benefit that is not available to others, but the general public benefits from well-qualified judges.
The same analysis applies to private property. The right to private property requires that all must have the right to own property and the protection of law in respect of their property. Private property privileges the rich over the poor, but it benefits the general public by driving material prosperity and social mobility.
In contrast, with the privileges conferred on favored political or identity groups, there is no benefit to the general public. The only benefit is to the privileged group, the social activist class, and the court intellectuals who defend the system. We would do well to heed Mises’s warning against these forms of group privilege:
Privilege is an institutional arrangement favoring some individuals or a certain group at the expense of the rest. The privilege exists, although it harms some—perhaps the majority—and benefits no one except those for whose advantage it was created.
Resentment, hostility and brewing social conflict are the only results. One has only to see the fallout in the case of Shiloh Hendrix to understand the significance of this:
. . .there are so many historical landmark cases that have been argued and decided at the United States Supreme Court, the Minnesota Supreme Court, and it has been long-settled law that speech is protected no matter how vile, no matter how offensive, racist, offensive, crude, ugly, vulgar. I mean, it’s the United States of America. Regardless of what your opinion is or how your feelings might be hurt by awful or ugly language, we protect it here.
That principle should apply to all without favor. Free speech should extend not only to those who say rude words, but also to those who express pride in their history and heritage. Americans who defend their Confederate heritage in the South, who want the liberty to sing Dixie at public events, also have a right to free speech—no matter how much social justice activists might claim to find that heritage offensive.