Born Again Christian; Biblical Fundamentalist, King James Only, Dispensational and libertarian
Tuesday, February 24, 2026
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What is Christian Zionism and how does it differ from other forms of Zionism?
The primary biblical foundation for Christian Zionism is the belief that the return of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is a fulfillment of biblical prophecy found in the Old and New Testaments.
Christian Zionism is a theological and political movement that combines evangelical Christian beliefs with a commitment to the support of the state of Israel and the Jewish people. This phenomenon has garnered attention in recent decades, particularly in the context of American politics and the Middle Eastern conflict. Understanding Christian Zionism involves examining its origins, beliefs, and how it distinctly differs from other forms of Zionism, including secular Zionism and Jewish Zionism.
The Origins of Christian Zionism
Christian Zionism traces its roots back to the Protestant Reformation and has evolved through various religious movements throughout history. The primary biblical foundation for Christian Zionism is the belief that the return of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is a fulfillment of biblical prophecy found in the Old and New Testaments.
Prominent figures such as John Nelson Darby in the 19th century played a significant role in popularizing these beliefs, particularly through the development of dispensationalist theology, which emphasized a literal interpretation of the Bible and an end-times narrative that includes the restoration of Israel.
Throughout the 20th century, particularly following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent events such as the Six-Day War in 1967, Christian Zionism gained momentum within evangelical circles. Many Christians began to view the return of the Jews to Israel as a prelude to the second coming of Christ, thus intertwining religious conviction with political ideology.
Core Beliefs of Christian Zionism
At its core, Christian Zionism posits that God's covenant with Israel and the Jewish people is eternal and unbreakable. Adherents believe that Jewish sovereignty over the land of Israel is divinely ordained and that Christian support for this sovereignty is both a moral obligation and a fulfillment of scripture. This belief system often encompasses the following tenets:
Biblical Prophecy: Many Christian Zionists view current events through the lens of biblical prophecy, believing that various scriptures predict the restoration of Israel and the significance of the Jewish people in God's plan.
Support for Israel: Christian Zionists are typically staunch supporters of the Israeli government and its policies, advocating for unconditional support from Western nations, especially the United States.
Opposition to Anti-Semitism: The movement often features a strong stance against anti-Semitism, inspired by a theological perspective that emphasizes the historical suffering of Jews and the need for protection and support.
Eschatological Views: Many in the movement believe that the return of Christ is imminent, which they believe hinges on the events surrounding Israel and the Jewish people.
How Christian Zionism Differs from Other Forms of Zionism
To truly understand Christian Zionism, it is essential to compare it with other forms of Zionism, primarily secular Zionism and Jewish religious Zionism.
Secular Zionism
Secular Zionism emerged in the late 19th century as a nationalist movement primarily among Jews in response to anti-Semitism and a desire for self-determination. Figures like Theodor Herzl played influential roles in promoting the idea of a Jewish homeland, emphasizing cultural and political aspects over religious ones. In contrast to Christian Zionism, which is driven by theological beliefs, secular Zionism is rooted in modern nationalism and focuses on the need for a safe haven from persecution, rather than fulfilling religious prophecies.
Jewish Religious Zionism
Jewish religious Zionism, while sharing some similarities with Christian Zionism in that it also believes in the divine connection to the land of Israel, is fundamentally different in its theological underpinnings. For Jewish religious Zionists, the return to Israel is part of a broader messianic expectation, deeply tied to Jewish identity and religious obligations. Unlike Christian Zionists, who often see the Jewish return as a precursor to Christian eschatology, Jewish religious Zionists view it as an essential step in the unfolding of God's plan for the Jewish people.
The Role of Politics
While both secular and Jewish religious Zionism aim for Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel, Christian Zionism is unique in its political aspect, which often seeks to influence Western policies, particularly in the United States, to align with their theological beliefs. This influence can manifest in significant political support for policies that favor Israeli sovereignty, with many Christian Zionists advocating for issues that resonate with their understanding of biblical prophecy, such as opposition to the division of Jerusalem and support for settlement expansion.
Conclusion
Christian Zionism is a complex and multifaceted movement that operates at the intersection of faith and politics. It is distinct from secular and Jewish religious forms of Zionism in its theological foundations and political aspirations. As the discourse surrounding Israel and its place in the global landscape continues to evolve, understanding the nuances of Christian Zionism is essential for a comprehensive grasp of the broader Zionist movement and its implications on contemporary geopolitical dynamics.
Christian Zionism FAQ
1. What is Christian Zionism?
Christian Zionism is a theological and political movement that combines evangelical Christian beliefs with strong support for the state of Israel and the Jewish people. It views the existence and prosperity of Israel as a fulfillment of biblical prophecy.
2. Where did Christian Zionism originate?
Christian Zionism traces its roots to the Protestant Reformation and was shaped by various religious movements, especially in the 19th century. Key figures like John Nelson Darby helped popularize dispensationalist theology, emphasizing a literal interpretation of the Bible and end-times prophecy.
3. How did Christian Zionism gain popularity?
The movement grew especially after the establishment of Israel in 1948 and events such as the Six-Day War in 1967. Many evangelical Christians began to see the return of Jews to Israel as a sign of the imminent second coming of Christ, blending political support with religious conviction.
4. What are the core beliefs of Christian Zionism?
God’s covenant with Israel is eternal and unbreakable.
Jewish sovereignty over Israel is divinely ordained.
Christians have a moral and scriptural duty to support Israel.
Biblical prophecy foretells the restoration of Israel.
Support for Israel’s government and policies is seen as essential.
Opposition to anti-Semitism is a core value.
Many believe the return of Christ depends on events involving Israel.
5. How is Christian Zionism different from secular Zionism?
Secular Zionism is a nationalist movement that emerged among Jews in the late 19th century, focused on creating a safe homeland in response to anti-Semitism. It is rooted in modern nationalism and does not rely on religious prophecy, unlike Christian Zionism.
6. How does Christian Zionism differ from Jewish religious Zionism?
Jewish religious Zionism shares belief in the divine connection to Israel but is based on Jewish messianic expectations and religious obligations. Christian Zionists see Jewish return as part of Christian eschatology (end-times prophecy), whereas Jewish religious Zionists view it as part of God’s plan for the Jewish people.
7. What role does politics play in Christian Zionism?
Christian Zionists often work to influence Western, especially U.S., policies to support Israel in accordance with their theological beliefs. This includes advocating for Israeli sovereignty, opposing the division of Jerusalem, and supporting settlement expansion.
8. Why is understanding Christian Zionism important?
Christian Zionism plays a significant role in both religious and geopolitical discussions, especially regarding U.S. foreign policy and the Middle East. Understanding its beliefs and motivations is essential for grasping the complexities of modern Zionist movements and their impact on world affairs.
Friday, February 20, 2026
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Monday, February 16, 2026
Why America’s Two-Party System Will Never Threaten the True Political Elites
https://mises.org/mises-wire/why-americas-two-party-system-will-never-threaten-true-political-elites
Whenever a new US president is sworn in, media pundits and court historians gush about the supposed “peaceful transfer of power” that is taking place. This has become a key tenet of the mythology and ideology surrounding democracy—that governing elites willfully abandon their control over the machinery of the state in response to election outcomes.
Indeed, this narrative about democracy is absolutely foundational to the perceived legitimacy of democracy. The contention that elections lead to a “peaceful transfer of power” reinforces the idea that the governing elites are determined by elections, and therefore by the “will of the people.” If “we the people” vote for a new group of rulers, then the old leaders will step aside a new group will take over.
At least, that’s how the story goes.
The first problem with this myth is that there is no “will of the people.” This is a fantasy that not even mainstream political scientists believe. The notion of the “general will“ is simply a doctrine of a civic religion that is employed to claim that elections grant government officials a “mandate” to rule.
[Read More: “No Matter How You Vote, Politicians Don’t Represent You“]
The absurdities of political “representation” and “the will of the people” are problematic, for sure, but in this column I want to address the central claim of the myth of the “peaceful transfer of power.” Namely, that power is meaningfully transferred from one group of governing elites to another.
It is indeed true that in the United States elected members of two major political parties rotate in and out of government offices. These elected officials, however, are only the public face of the actual governing elite which very much retains power before and after the ostensible “transfer” of power from one group of elected officials to another.
Signs of this reality can be found in how policies change very little in spite of alleged “transfers” of power. Yes, some less-significant policy areas experience changes as the regime-sanctioned political parties circulate. These include “culture war” policies such as abortion and DEI jobs at universities. But policy areas that significantly augment the ruling elite’s financial power—most notably foreign policy, central banking, and major welfare-state programs such as Medicare—are largely untouchable by the elected government.
Moreover, access to positions of elected office are controlled. Specifically, only certain political parties are allowed to actually compete for elected positions of importance. Access to positions of power within the parties themselves, with only a handful of exceptions, are restricted to candidates acceptable to the governing elite.
Politics Isn’t a Friendly Game, and Power Is Not Surrendered Easily
Americans tend to have a relatively cheerful view of the political system. Some would call it naïve. Many Americans even believe—if they have opinions about it all—that ruling elites are motivated by noble desires such as helping the poor, keeping people safe, or otherwise doing good works. If one believes this, it is much easier to believe that governing elites will willingly and peacefully give up their positions of power if they lose an election.
This strains the bounds of plausibility when we consider the true nature of the process of obtaining and wielding political power. For insights into this, we have to look beyond the Anglosphere and its rather optimistic and innocent view of political institutions. For a darker and more realistic—and more accurate—view, we can look to the Italian sociologist and economist Vilfredo Pareto. Pareto understood that ruling elites within a democratic regime oversee a complex system of patrons and clients who assist each other in benefiting from what Frédéric Bastiat called legal plunder.
This process of exploiting the masses for the benefit of the ruling elite (and its clients) exists in every modern state, but the process does not work the same way in a democracy as in a dictatorship or absolute monarchy. In Pareto’s view, the ruling elite in a democracy is relatively large and must manage a large and diverse network of clients which are bought off and otherwise “encouraged” to support the elite.
Because of the size and complexity of the elite class, it is unwieldy. Unlike the Marxists, Pareto does not point to any single industry or economic class as representative of the ruling elites. He certainly does not believe any single individual is a key decisionmaker. Rather, the governing class can include both the class of entrepreneurs and industrialists alongside labor groups and government employees. The challenge for the ruling elite lies in establishing a position of patronage in relation to each group in such a way as to create a “symbiosis” among all groups so they they all accept the ruling elite as ultimately beneficial. Consequently, the system of ruling elites is characterized by Pareto biographer S.E. Finer as:
a “connexion” of centers of influence and patronage; and in the modern state, these are increasingly based on economic interest. These various power centers are forever quarrelling and competing with one another but nevertheless have sufficient cohesion to warrant calling them a “class.” How does this come about? Emphatically not by conspiracy. 1
That is, the ruling elite does not function as a conspiratorial party with a specific and directed singular goal. According to Pareto, because of its size and complexity, it would be a mistake for observers to assume that the ruling elite “has a single will, implementing preconceived plans by logical procedures.” It is not a “concrete unit.”2 Nonetheless, cohesion is achieved due to economic self-interest, as Finer puts it:
Such cohesion as it possesses comes about in three ways. In the first place, all the principals, i.e., the heads of each cluster of influence and patronage, live to some extent by taking in each others’ washing. Next, insofar as they are all actuated by economic self interest they naturally tend to act in a common direction ...Finally they are made the more coherent by their “inner government”—a political party or a cabinet which controls the public authorities.”3
The maintenance of this system—and thus the maintenance of the ruling elite’s power—depends on constant efforts to manage and manipulate clients with both cunning and largesse. In a democratic system, the use of violence is generally avoided (but not off limits) as violence signals a breakdown of the managerial skills of the elite.
The complexity of this system—which Pareto called “pluto-democracy”—illustrates how implausible it is to think that the ruling class will simply give up power if it loses an election. The amount of time, effort, ingenuity, and resources that goes into sustaining the power of the governing elite will not be willfully thrown aside. After all, the stakes are incredibly high, as the governing elite’s powers are critical to augmenting the power, wealth, honors, and prestige of its members (and their families). It would be absurd to contemplate handing these privileges over to a competing counter elite every few years because of the outcome of an election.
This helps explain why there are so rarely any substantial changes to the core government institutions that function at the core of the patronage system. Defense spending, foreign interventions, too-big-to-fail, Medicare policies, and welfare spending are all central to continuing the patron-client relationships and buttressing the ruling elite’s access to resources while neutralizing political opposition.
Two Types of Political Parties: Pro-Regime vs. Revolutionary
Consequently, party politics within modern democracies is allowed to play out only to the extent that the parties function within the superstructure established by the governing elite. This means parties participate in supposedly “competitive” elections, but it also means that only select political parties are allowed to participate.
Thus, Pareto classifies political parties this way:
In our western political systems, parties are divisible into two broad classes: 1. parties which alternate with one another in government; 2. intransigent, uncompromising parties which do not get into government. ... the parties which do not get into government are often more honest, but also more fanatical and sectarian, than parties which do exercise power.4
Pareto concludes that the moderate and compromising parties that rotate in and out of government are “part of the governing elite.” On the other hand, those parties that are “uncompromising” and “fanatical” are not permitted to be part of the governing elite since they “wished to wreck and overturn the system.” It was only these latter parties, Finer notes, that were counted by Pareto as “a genuine counterelite.” For this reason, “It is absurd to equate [Pareto’s] elites and counter elites with the struggles of Labour and Conservaive, or Republican and Democrat. Both are parts of their respective governing classes.”5
To ensure that the governing parties cannot threaten the networks of the governing elite, access to the parties and to positions of leadership within the parties are controlled. For insights into this, we can consult another Italian, Gaetano Mosca who notes that voters only are permitted to choose their “representatives” from a menu presented to them by the political parties. There are numerous safeguards put in place by these parties to ensure that the parties cannot be used as a tool of any true counterelite. Thus, for Mosca and for Pareto, the elite-approved political parties are imposing a pre-determined outcome, within a range of acceptable options, and Mosca writes: “When we say that the voters “choose” their representative, we are using a language that is very inexact. The truth is that the representative has himself elected by the voters.”6
Even if Mosca is overstating the case here, and a candidate is not fully able to impose his election on the voters through partisan antics (or through propaganda), it is nonetheless undeniable that the parties can nearly always decide who the voters will not vote for. Those candidates unacceptable to the elite will not be able to get past the partisan gatekeepers.
Yes, there will be some exceptions, such as Ron Paul or Thomas Massie, who do appear to be among those who might be described as “uncompromising.” But, a small number of these candidates, with no hope of forming a governing majority or attaining the highest offices, can be tolerated.
What matters is that the “fanatical” political parties will not be permitted to circulate as governing parties, and the acceptable parties will cooperate with the ruling elite by ensuring that the governing parties remain safe, cooperative, and of no threat to the elite.
Moreover, if any of the governing parties were to threaten the established system of patronage, they would cease to be regarded as “acceptable” parties and would join the “fanatical” parties among the locked-out coalitions. This helps illustrate why it is always a false hope to think that either the Republican or Democratic party will ever threaten the current status quo of the ruling elite. The fact that they alternate as part of the governing elite is proof enough that they are no threat to the governing elites.
Considering all this, the idea that political power is actually transferred freely and peacefully between groups of counter-elites ought to be thoroughly dismissed. The benefits of membership in the governing elite is too valuable to be risked in any truly open elections. This would not be tolerable to either the elites themselves, or by the political clients who see the perpetuation of the system as in their own economic self-interest.
- 1
S.E. Finer, “Pareto and Pluto-Democracy: The Retreat to Galapagos,” The American Political Science Review 62, No. 2 (Jun. 1968):447.
- 2
Vilfredo Pareto, Sociological Writings, S.E. Finer, ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966)p. 269.
- 3
Finer, “Pluto-Democracy,” p. 447.
- 4
Pareto, Sociological Writings, p. 271.
- 5
Finer, “Pluto-Democracy,” p. 447.
- 6
Gaetano Mosca, “The Ruling Class in a Representative Democracy,” in Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization, Eva Etzioni-Halevy, ed. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1997)p. 55.
Sunday, February 15, 2026
National Self-Determination and Individual Liberty by Wanjiru Njoya
https://mises.org/mises-wire/national-self-determination-and-individual-liberty
In his book The Essential Rothbard, David Gordon observes that, “Rothbard was no ivory-tower scholar, interested only in academic controversies. Quite the contrary, he combined Austrian economics with a fervent commitment to individual liberty.” One of Rothbard’s important intellectual contributions to defending individual liberty concerns the subject of national self-determination. In his essay “The Nationalities Question,” he depicted national self-determination as “a moral principle and a beacon-light for all nations,” insisting that self-determination is derived from the individual right to self-ownership and “not something to be imposed by outside governmental coercion.” He rejected what he called a “simplistic” view of individual liberty which presumes that national identity is antithetical to individual liberty. He argued that, “In the real world, then, national self-determination is a vitally important matter in which libertarians should properly take sides…nationalism has its disadvantages for liberty; but also has its strengths, and libertarians should try to help tip it in the latter direction.”
Further, Rothbard argued that the ideal of justice, which he saw as essential to the defense of liberty, also applied to the delineation of national boundaries. Nations must be based on consent, and the boundaries between nations should—as far as possible—be just. He argued that, “National boundaries are only just insofar as they are based on voluntary consent and the property rights of their members or citizens.” In his view, it would follow that,
In practice, the way to have such national boundaries as just as possible is to preserve and cherish the right of secession, the right of different regions, groups, or ethnic nationalities to get the blazes out of the larger entity, to set up their own independent nation. Only by boldly asserting the right of secession can the concept of national self-determination be anything more than a sham and a hoax.
As Rothbard saw it, nationalism is tipped in the direction of advancing individual liberty when it is based on the principles of limited government and state rights. It is, therefore, no surprise that Rothbard also robustly defended the Southern tradition which historically championed these political doctrines. For example, John Randolph of Roanoke defended natural rights, individual liberty, and states’ rights, concepts which lie at the heart of the philosophical tradition to which Rothbard referred in his essay “Mr. Bush’s Shooting War”:
I stand with the great John Randolph of Roanoke, who set forth his principles thus:
“Love of peace, hatred of offensive war, jealousy of the state governments toward the general government; a dread of standing armies; a loathing of public debt, taxes, and excises; tenderness for the liberty of the citizen; jealousy, Argus-eyed jealousy, of the patronage of the president.”
Also reflecting these principles, the historian Frank L. Owsley argued in his article “The Irrepressible Conflict” that the doctrine of “State Rights” is essential to the defense of minority interests and individual liberty against the tyranny of the majority. Rothbard aligned with this interpretation of state rights. He argued that the South was right to oppose the centralization of federal power, describing Lincoln’s “unitary nation-state” as “monstrous” and destructive of “individual and local liberties” through, for example,
…the triumph of an all-powerful federal judiciary, Supreme Court, and national army; the overriding of the ancient Anglo-Saxon and libertarian right of habeas corpus by jailing dissidents against the war without trial; the establishment of martial rule; the suppression of freedom of the press; and the largely permanent establishment of conscription, the income tax, the pietist “sin” taxes against liquor and tobacco, the corrupt and cartelizing “partnership of government and industry” constituting massive subsidies to transcontinental railroads, and the protective tariff; the establishment of fiat money inflation through the greenbacks and getting off the gold standard; and the nationalization of the banking system through the national Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864.
Against that background, it is easy to see that Rothbard’s political philosophy does not treat individual liberty as merely a theoretical or abstract concept—it is also rooted in practical reality, in human nature, in how real human beings actually live and coexist with people from different nations. As Gordon observes, “He endeavored to apply the ideas he had developed in his theoretical work to current politics and to bring libertarian views to the attention of the general public.” In “The Nationalities Question,” Rothbard criticized the libertarian view of individual liberty, which often tends to be critical of nationalism, as “simplistic” and even “vulgar” due to its tendency to cling to abstract theories that take no account of the reality of the human condition. He explained:
A typical critique would run as follows: “There is no nation; there are only individuals. The nation is a collectivist and therefore pernicious concept. The concept of ‘national self-determination’ is fallacious, since only the individual has a ‘self.’ Since the nation and the State are both collective concepts, both are pernicious and should be combated.”
Rothbard’s answer to that critique is that “self-determination” is a metaphor and does not literally conceptualize the nation as having a “self” of its own distinct from its individual people. He distinguished between the “nation” and the “state” or “government,” and cautioned against ignoring the reality that individual human beings generally belong—voluntarily or by consent—to a family, a community, a nation.
More seriously, we must not fall into a nihilist trap. While only individuals exist individuals do not exist as isolated and hermetically sealed atoms. Statists traditionally charge libertarians and individualists with being “atomistic individualists,” and the charge, one hopes, has always been incorrect and misconceived.
He, therefore, urged libertarians to “get over simplistic individualism” and acknowledge that individuals are not atomistic but form societies based on “ethnicity and nationality,” reflecting factors such as “culture, values, traditions, religion, and language.” As a strategic matter, he formed alliances with conservative groups who hold to this view of national self-determination even though they do not ground their views doctrinally in Lockean principles of self-ownership. As Gordon explains, this led some libertarians to wonder why Rothbard would forge political alliances with conservatives, most notably through the John Randolph Club which supported the presidential bid mounted by the “America First” conservative Patrick J. Buchanan.
Some professed to find a contradiction in Rothbard’s political activities. He often criticized other libertarians for deviating from the correct “line”; yet he himself sought alliances with divergent groups, both on the Left and the Right. There is in fact no contradiction here: Rothbard held libertarians to a much stricter standard than outsiders. For those within the fold, doctrinal orthodoxy was a must; but alliances with outsiders were another matter. Here tactics were all important, and a general agreement on principles was neither required nor expected.
The case for forging alliances with outsiders who also seek to advance individual liberty, and the doctrine of nations by consent, becomes morally and politically compelling precisely because the ultimate goal is to advance individual liberty.